Chapter IX of X · The Bank and the Mint

A bank run, playable: how a healthy bank fails

A perfectly healthy bank, one rumour, and a queue. You queue for your coins. So does everyone. Then the bank dies.

Play Chapter IX free ▸ Chapter IX of The Visible Hand: The Bank and the Mint

The idea

Banks lend out most of what is deposited, so no bank can pay everyone back at once. If enough people fear others will withdraw, it becomes rational for each to withdraw first, and the fear makes itself true. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) showed that a bank run can happen to a sound bank: there are two equilibria, and belief decides which one you get. Deposit insurance removes the reason to run, and if it is credible, it never has to be used. The same chapter shows why a mint that cannot print at will (a committed central bank) keeps money trusted.

What you do in the game

A healthy bank faces a rumour. Players queue for their coins, the bank fails, and then they try a deposit guarantee and a mint that can’t print at will. It takes about 5–8 minutes, runs in any browser and needs no account.

Why it matters today

Silicon Valley Bank in 2023 and Northern Rock in 2007 were modern runs; deposit guarantees and central bank independence are the lessons built into today’s system.

Think about it
  1. If you heard your bank might fail, would you rush to withdraw? Even if it was healthy?
  2. The bank was healthy. Why did it fail anyway?
  3. The guarantee was never used. So why did it work?
Try it yourself ▸

Sources the game cites: Diamond & Dybvig (1983); Kydland & Prescott (1977). Teaching this? See the lesson plan for Chapter IX.

More ideas you can play

The CampfirePareto improvement and Pareto efficiencyThe Villageallocation without prices: lotteries, queues and strategy-proofnessThe Market Townmarket-clearing prices and price ceilingsThe Trading Portadverse selection and the market for lemonsThe Factory Cityexternalities, the Pigouvian tax and the tragedy of the commonsThe Town Hallthe Condorcet paradox, agenda setting and Arrow’s theoremThe Capitalauctions, bid shading and the Vickrey second-price auctionThe Economythe circular flow and the paradox of thriftThe Handrules vs discretion, time inconsistency, the Lucas critique and AI government