Chapter X of X · The Hand

Rules or a ruler? Govern a city, then watch a machine govern it

Every exception makes one person grateful, and teaches everyone else that the rules can be bargained. Then a machine that only follows published rules governs the same year.

Play Chapter X free ▸ Chapter X of The Visible Hand: The Hand

The idea

Kydland and Prescott (1977) showed that a government free to decide case by case can do worse than one bound by rules, even if it means well: people expect the exceptions and change their behaviour, so the good outcome slips away. This is time inconsistency. Lucas (1976) warned that people respond to policy itself, so a rule that worked in the past can stop working once people adapt to it, much as an AI system “games” a badly written goal. In the game you govern for a year, then a rule-following machine governs the same year, and you compare. The game ends with a question, not an answer: would you rather live under rules you can read, or a ruler you can ask?

The machine in the game is a fixed-rule policy in a small model, not a real AI. The game presents its conclusion as the author’s argument, not as settled fact.

What you do in the game

Players govern the whole city, which runs by itself. Trouble arrives (a bank wobbles, trade stops), and people ask for exceptions. Granting one wins gratitude, and teaches everyone else that the rules can be bargained. It takes about 5–8 minutes, runs in any browser and needs no account.

Why it matters today

Central bank independence, inflation targets, constitutional limits, and the new debate over handing decisions to algorithms and AI all turn on this question.

Think about it
  1. A friend asks you to bend a rule just once. Is that ever the right call for a government?
  2. Each exception looked reasonable. Why did the city end up worse off?
  3. Why do many countries make their central banks independent of politicians?
Try it yourself ▸

Sources the game cites: Kydland & Prescott (1977); Lucas (1976); Nordhaus (1975). Teaching this? See the lesson plan for Chapter X.

More ideas you can play

The CampfirePareto improvement and Pareto efficiencyThe Villageallocation without prices: lotteries, queues and strategy-proofnessThe Market Townmarket-clearing prices and price ceilingsThe Trading Portadverse selection and the market for lemonsThe Factory Cityexternalities, the Pigouvian tax and the tragedy of the commonsThe Town Hallthe Condorcet paradox, agenda setting and Arrow’s theoremThe Capitalauctions, bid shading and the Vickrey second-price auctionThe Economythe circular flow and the paradox of thriftThe Bank and the Mintbank runs, deposit insurance and central bank commitment