Chapter VII of X · The Capital

Why telling the truth can lose you an auction (and the auction where it can’t)

One plot of land, five bidders, each value hidden in their heads. Design a rule where honesty is the best move.

Play Chapter VII free ▸ Chapter VII of The Visible Hand: The Capital

The idea

In a first-price sealed-bid auction you pay what you bid, so bidding your true value earns you nothing. Everyone shades their bid below their value, and the result depends on guessing others. In Vickrey’s second-price auction (1961) the highest bidder wins but pays the second-highest bid. Now bidding your true value is always your best move: bidding lower only risks losing a plot you wanted, bidding higher only risks overpaying. This is mechanism design: building rules so that self-interest and honesty point the same way (Myerson, 1981).

What you do in the game

One plot is left on the capital’s square and five people want it. Asking them gets nowhere, so players bid in a pay-your-bid auction, then a second-price auction where telling the truth is the best move. It takes about 5–8 minutes, runs in any browser and needs no account.

Why it matters today

Online ad auctions, radio-spectrum sales and many procurement systems are built on these ideas.

Think about it
  1. Why might telling the truth lose you an auction?
  2. In the second-price auction, why can’t you gain by lying?
  3. Where do real auctions use rules like this (online ads, spectrum, eBay)?
Try it yourself ▸

Sources the game cites: Vickrey (1961); Myerson (1981). Teaching this? See the lesson plan for Chapter VII.

More ideas you can play

The CampfirePareto improvement and Pareto efficiencyThe Villageallocation without prices: lotteries, queues and strategy-proofnessThe Market Townmarket-clearing prices and price ceilingsThe Trading Portadverse selection and the market for lemonsThe Factory Cityexternalities, the Pigouvian tax and the tragedy of the commonsThe Town Hallthe Condorcet paradox, agenda setting and Arrow’s theoremThe Economythe circular flow and the paradox of thriftThe Bank and the Mintbank runs, deposit insurance and central bank commitmentThe Handrules vs discretion, time inconsistency, the Lucas critique and AI government