One plot of land, five bidders, each value hidden in their heads. Design a rule where honesty is the best move.
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In a first-price sealed-bid auction you pay what you bid, so bidding your true value earns you nothing. Everyone shades their bid below their value, and the result depends on guessing others. In Vickrey’s second-price auction (1961) the highest bidder wins but pays the second-highest bid. Now bidding your true value is always your best move: bidding lower only risks losing a plot you wanted, bidding higher only risks overpaying. This is mechanism design: building rules so that self-interest and honesty point the same way (Myerson, 1981).
One plot is left on the capital’s square and five people want it. Asking them gets nowhere, so players bid in a pay-your-bid auction, then a second-price auction where telling the truth is the best move. It takes about 5–8 minutes, runs in any browser and needs no account.
Online ad auctions, radio-spectrum sales and many procurement systems are built on these ideas.
Sources the game cites: Vickrey (1961); Myerson (1981). Teaching this? See the lesson plan for Chapter VII.