Eight dye works, none of them wicked. Together they kill the fishers’ catch. Who should pay?
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An externality is a cost (or benefit) of a trade that falls on someone outside it. The dye works and its customers strike a fair bargain, but the fishers downstream pay part of the price. Because nobody is charged for the harm, too much of it happens. Pigou (1920) proposed charging each polluter the harm it does: a Pigouvian tax. Then only the activities worth more than the damage they cause keep going. Coase (1960) asked whether the two sides could simply bargain. Hardin’s tragedy of the commons (1968) is the same logic applied to shared resources.
Eight dye works upstream, fishers downstream. Nobody is evil, yet the river dies. Players try charging each works for the harm it does. It takes about 5–8 minutes, runs in any browser and needs no account.
Carbon taxes, congestion charges and fishing quotas are all attempts to put the missing price back.
Sources the game cites: Pigou (1920); Coase (1960); Samuelson (1954); Hardin (1968). Teaching this? See the lesson plan for Chapter V.