Chapter VI of X · The Town Hall

The Condorcet paradox: a fair vote that can pick whoever you want

Nine voters, three projects, voting two at a time. Change only the order of the votes and a different project wins. Nobody changes their mind.

Play Chapter VI free ▸ Chapter VI of The Visible Hand: The Town Hall

The idea

Condorcet noticed in 1785 that majorities can go in a circle: most people prefer A to B, most prefer B to C, and yet most prefer C to A. When that happens, the result of a series of pairwise votes depends on the agenda, so whoever sets the order picks the winner. Arrow (1951) proved something deeper: with three or more options, no ranked voting rule meets every reasonable fairness condition at once. Gibbard (1973) showed that every such rule rewards some voters for voting strategically.

Careful: Arrow’s theorem is about ranked voting rules. It does not mean “democracy can’t be fair”. It means every rule makes a trade-off, and someone chooses which one.

What you do in the game

Nine voters, three projects, voting two at a time. Change only the order of the votes and a different project wins. It takes about 5–8 minutes, runs in any browser and needs no account.

Why it matters today

Committee agendas, primary systems and the debates over ranked-choice, approval and score voting all live inside this result.

Think about it
  1. If everyone votes honestly, does the majority always pick the same winner?
  2. Nobody changed their mind. Why did the winner change?
  3. Who has the real power in a committee: the voters, or whoever sets the agenda?
Try it yourself ▸

Sources the game cites: Arrow (1951); Gibbard (1973). Teaching this? See the lesson plan for Chapter VI.

More ideas you can play

The CampfirePareto improvement and Pareto efficiencyThe Villageallocation without prices: lotteries, queues and strategy-proofnessThe Market Townmarket-clearing prices and price ceilingsThe Trading Portadverse selection and the market for lemonsThe Factory Cityexternalities, the Pigouvian tax and the tragedy of the commonsThe Capitalauctions, bid shading and the Vickrey second-price auctionThe Economythe circular flow and the paradox of thriftThe Bank and the Mintbank runs, deposit insurance and central bank commitmentThe Handrules vs discretion, time inconsistency, the Lucas critique and AI government